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Although members of several social groups report feeling guilt because of their group’s actions, 
average reports of group-based guilt tend to be quite low. We investigate three antecedents 
of group-based guilt derived from research on social justice and interpersonal emotion. We 
fi nd that Whites, men and women perceive inequality, responsibility and justifi ability of group 
differences to the same extent. Moreover, each factor is a key antecedent of guilt for Whites, 
men and women. We also fi nd an interaction between justifi ability and responsibility such that 
reports of group-based guilt increase as perceptions of ingroup responsibility increase and 
justifi cations for group differences decrease. Given the benefi cial consequences of group-based 
guilt for intergroup relations, it is important to understand what factors lead to group-based 
guilt.
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Although some individuals report feeling 
guilt because of their group’s actions, average 
reports of group-based guilt are often quite low 
(Swim & Miller, 1999). Yet, when experienced, 
group-based guilt can motivate benefi cial social 
action including apology for past acts committed 
by ingroup members (Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Manstead, 2004) and majority group 
member participation in collective action on 
behalf of disadvantaged social groups (Mallett, 
Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2006). Research has 
yet to clarify exactly why reports of group-based 
guilt tend to be low, but it has established that 
at least two factors are critical antecedents of 
guilt at the group level (Branscombe, Doosje, & 
McGarty, 2003). First, there must be an apparent 
inequality between groups which could be the 
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result of long-term disadvantage or of a one-
time critical incident. Second, the ingroup must 
be seen as responsible for the inequality. Some 
research also indicates that justifi cations for 
inequality may reduce feelings of group-based 
guilt (Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006). 
Past research has routinely assessed potential 
antecedents of group-based guilt in isolation, 
thereby failing to provide a complete picture of 
the relative strength of key antecedents. More-
over, the majority of past research has examined 
feelings of guilt in only one group at a time, 
leaving unanswered the question of whether 
relations among the antecedents and group-
based guilt differ between social groups. We 
synthesize the existing research by simultaneously 
examining three antecedents of group-based 
guilt in Whites, men and women. 
Antecedents of group-based guilt
Perceived inequality
Research on social justice and interpersonal 
emotions reveals that personal feelings of 
guilt can result when people perceive that they 
are over-benefi ted or have harmed another 
person (Austin & Walster, 1974; Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Sprecher, 1986; 
Walster & Walster, 1975; Walster et al., 1978). 
Similarly, group-based feelings of guilt can 
result from perceived or actual intergroup 
inequality (Branscombe et al., 2003), of which 
there is ample evidence (e.g. Anderson, 1989; 
Russo, 1995; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; 
Turner & Kramer, 1995). Data supporting the 
connection between perceived inequality and 
group-based guilt exists for a variety of groups, 
including Whites’ reports of group-based guilt 
for White privilege and Black disadvantage 
(Swim & Miller, 1999), Germans’ reports of 
guilt for enacting genocide against the Jews 
(Rensmann, 2004), and men’s reports of guilt 
for privileges they have over women (Schmidt, 
Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004). 
The present research tests three hypotheses 
related to this well-established antecedent. First, 
we predict that the more a group difference is 
perceived to be important and advantageous 
to the ingroup, the more likely individuals will 
be to report group-based guilt. We assume that 
people will be able to recognize that a group 
difference exists when it is brought to their 
attention. But even when faced with examples 
of group differences that favor the ingroup, 
some individuals may not report group-based 
guilt. To uncover when perceived inequality 
is related to guilt, we assess the magnitude of 
perceived inequality by measuring the percep-
tion that a group difference is important and 
provides an advantage to the ingroup (Lerner, 
1981). Although women may acknowledge that 
they are more likely to receive assistance with 
car trouble than men, if women do not perceive 
that vehicular assistance is important or that it 
gives women an advantage over men, then they 
may not feel particularly guilty about that group 
difference. In contrast, if Whites perceive their 
greater likelihood of having an economic safety 
net than Blacks is important and advantageous, 
they might report feeling group-based guilt. 
Second, we hypothesize that perceived in-
equality will uniquely predict reports of group-
based guilt above and beyond perceptions of 
responsibility and justifi ability. Third, we test 
whether perceived inequality is a key antecedent 
of group-based guilt for members of three 
different social groups. To our knowledge, ours 
is the fi rst research to examine the antecedents 
of group-based guilt among members of a dis-
advantaged group (i.e. women). We expect that 
perceptions of inequality will infl uence reports 
of guilt to the same extent across groups. It is 
possible, however, that the strength of the asso-
ciation between perceived inequality and guilt 
will vary by group membership—particularly 
if perceived inequality resulting from ingroup 
privilege is construed in the larger social con-
text. For example, to the extent that women’s 
advantages are tied to their dependency on 
men (e.g. being helped by men) or to traditional 
gender roles that maintain the existing social 
order (e.g. being awarded child custody), women 
may perceive that a group difference produces 
little inequality because it comes at a cost to 
women. Or it could lead to the assessment of 
inequality having less of an impact on women’s 
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group-based guilt. Therefore, the impact of 
perceived inequality on feelings of group-based 
guilt might differ depending on the group under 
consideration. 
Perceived responsibility
Consistent with past research we predict that the 
more the ingroup is perceived to be responsible 
for their privileges, the more likely people will 
be to report group-based guilt. Personal guilt 
results when people accept responsibility for 
an action or inaction that caused another to 
suffer (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998; 
Hoffman, 1994), and group-based guilt results 
when people accept ingroup responsibility for 
harm infl icted on the outgroup (Branscombe 
et al., 2003; Branscombe, Slugoksi, & Kappen, 
2004; Iyer, Leach, & Pederson, 2004). We conceive 
of responsibility as being composed of both ac-
countability for creating a group difference, which 
implies that responsibility is in the past, and 
accountability for maintaining a group difference, 
which implies that responsibility continues to the 
present day. Feelings of group, but not personal 
responsibility, are positively related to reports 
of group-based guilt for both minimal groups 
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 
1998) and a variety of existing social groups 
(Branscombe, Doosje & McGarty, 2002). 
We test two hypotheses related to perceptions 
of ingroup responsibility. First, we test whether 
ingroup responsibility predicts feelings of 
group-based guilt above and beyond perceived 
inequality and justifi ability. Existing research 
that measures or manipulates group-based guilt 
generally confounds inequality and responsibility. 
For example, items from Branscombe and col-
leagues’ (2004) collective guilt acceptance scale 
invokes group responsibility and resulting in-
equality in the same statement, ‘I feel regret 
for my group’s harmful past actions toward 
other groups’. Determining the extent to which 
guilt results from ingroup responsibility versus 
perceived inequality would further clarify the 
construct of group-based guilt. Discovering 
the unique predictive ability of responsibility 
is an especially worthy goal considering that 
not all research has found that accepting 
responsibility is necessary to feel guilt. For 
instance, Hoffman (1994) describes two guilt-
producing situations, the innocent bystander and 
the virtual transgressor, where the individual is 
not necessarily responsible for a transgression 
but feels guilt anyway. Although Hoffman did not 
consider group-based guilt, his analysis indicates 
that responsibility may not play as essential a 
role as other research indicates. 
Second, we test whether perceived ingroup 
responsibility is perceived to the same extent 
across groups and has the same relation with 
guilt for Whites, men and women. As with per-
ceived inequality, we expect that perceptions 
of responsibility will infl uence reports of guilt 
to the same extent across groups, but it is also 
possible that the strength of the association be-
tween responsibility and guilt will vary by group 
membership. For example, because gender dif-
ferences, more so than racial differences, may 
be attributed to biological imperatives and the 
socially accepted complementarity of group 
roles, assessments of responsibility may differ or 
responsibility may play less of a role in predicting 
gender-based guilt than race-based guilt. 
Perceived justifi ability
Most discussions of group-based guilt do not in-
clude assessments of the justifi ability of group 
differences as a required antecedent, but research 
on social justice suggests that justifi cations for 
group differences could infl uence the level of 
guilt experienced (Lerner, 1981; Montada & 
Schneider, 1989; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & 
Huo, 1997). At the individual level, guilt results 
if an act violates personal standards for justice or 
morality (Harder & Greenwald, 1999; Monteith, 
Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Roseman, 1984), 
and at the group level, perceived justifi ability 
of group differences reduces the overall experi-
ence of guilt (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). Based 
upon this research, we anticipate that perceived 
justifi ability will be an important antecedent of 
group-based guilt. 
We test two hypotheses relevant to perceptions 
of justifi ability. First, since past research has rarely 
considered perceptions of justifi ability, we test 
whether justifi ability uniquely predicts feelings 
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of group-based guilt when perceived inequality 
and responsibility are also assessed. Second, we 
test whether perceived justifi ability is perceived 
to the same extent and has the same relation to 
guilt across three different social groups. Similar 
to perceived responsibility, beliefs about innate 
gender differences and gender roles may be used 
to legitimize gender group differences (Glick 
& Fiske, 1997). Thus, justifi cations generated 
for gender may be perceived as more credible 
than justifi cations generated for race and may 
therefore have more infl uence in diminishing 
feelings of gender-based guilt. 
Interactions between perceived 
inequality, responsibility and 
justifi ability
The above analysis indicates that perceptions 
of inequality and ingroup responsibility will 
increase feelings of group-based guilt and that 
perceptions of justifi ability will decrease feelings 
of group-based guilt. It is possible that the three 
antecedents are additive, such that more in-
equality and responsibility and less justifi ability 
produce the most guilt. Alternatively, if any 
of the three factors are necessary conditions 
to experience guilt, then they should interact 
with the others over and above their additive 
effects. Below we outline possible patterns of 
interactions that might emerge. 
Perceived inequality may be a necessary ante-
cedent of group-based guilt, as it might fi rst be 
necessary to decide that a group difference exists 
before assessing responsibility or justifi ability. 
Even if a group difference is acknowledged, re-
sponsibility and justifi ability may not strongly 
infl uence group-based guilt unless the difference 
is perceived to be important and advantageous. 
For instance, if women perceive that being less 
likely than men to pay for a romantic evening 
is not important or advantageous, whether or 
not women perceive that they are responsible 
for the difference or that it is justifi able, they 
may not feel particularly guilty. Thus, perceived 
inequality and perceptions of responsibility 
and justifi ability may interact such that as per-
ceptions of inequality increase, perceptions 
of responsibility and justifi ability are stronger 
predictors of group-based guilt. 
When group differences are perceived to 
be important and advantageous, perceived 
justifications may diminish the impact of 
responsibility on feelings of group-based guilt. 
For example, if women perceive that women 
receiving custody of children after a divorce is 
justifi ed because of innate gender differences in 
the ability to nurture and parent, then women’s 
perceptions of responsibility for receiving custody 
may have less infl uence on guilt than if receiving 
custody was not perceived to be justifi ed. Thus, 
we may fi nd a three-way interaction between 
inequality, justifi ability and responsibility such 
that group-based guilt only occurs when group 
differences are perceived to produce inequality, 
are unjustifi ed and the ingroup is perceived to 
be responsible. 
Goals of the present research
With the goal of better understanding what 
factors lead to feelings of group-based guilt, we 
asked participants to read descriptions of several 
group differences that favored their ingroup. 
For example, women read examples of group 
differences that favored women and men read 
examples of group differences that favored 
men. Participants rated the extent to which they 
perceived that each difference was important 
and advantageous (i.e. extent of inequality), 
that their group was responsible for creating 
and maintaining each difference (i.e. extent of 
responsibility), that each difference was justi-
fi able, and that they felt group-based guilt for 
each difference. First, we tested whether the 
three groups perceived the antecedents and 
group-based guilt in the same manner. Second, 
we tested whether the relations between the 
antecedents and group-based guilt differed by 
group membership. Third, we tested whether 
each factor was a unique antecedent of group-
based guilt. Specifi cally, we predicted that the 
more inequality and responsibility participants 
perceived and the less justifi ability they perceived, 
the more they would report group-based guilt. 
Fourth, although we expected to fi nd mainly 
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additive effects, we also explored whether there 
were interactions between the antecedents and 
group-based guilt. 
Method
Participants
We tested our hypotheses in three samples. Par-
ticipants from all three samples were enrolled 
in undergraduate psychology classes at the 
Pennsylvania State University. Participants for the 
White sample included 38 males and 96 females, 
ranging in age from 18 to 46 (M = 18.9, SD = 3.0). 
All participants reported their race/ethnicity 
as White. Participants for the sample of men 
included 115 men, ranging in age from 18 to 
23 (M = 19.4, SD = 1.4); 5% of the sample were 
Asian, 2.6% were Black, 2.6% were Hispanic, 
88.7% were White and less than 1% chose the 
label of something else. Participants for the 
sample of women included 109 women, ranging 
in age from 18 to 37 (M = 19.7, SD = 3.8); 1% of 
the sample were American Indian, 7.3% were 
Asian, 10.9% were Black, 2.7% were Hispanic, 
76.4% were White and 1.8% designated their 
background as something else. All participants 
completed materials for this study on the 
Internet. 
Materials and procedure
Participants fi rst provided demographic infor-
mation and then evaluated a series of group 
differences that pertained to their ingroup only. 
For example, Whites only read about group 
differences that favored Whites. Salient group 
membership is critical to producing feelings of 
group-based guilt (Branscombe, Doosje & McGarty, 
2002). We ensured that race was salient for the 
sample of Whites and gender was salient for 
the samples of women and men by having all 
participants indicate their race or gender at the 
beginning of the survey and by highlighting 
the social group of interest in each item. For 
example, White participants saw the phrase 
‘Whites, as a group’ 114 times while completing 
the study measures. 
Gender differences were selected from 
Branscombe’s (1998) list of gender privileges 
and we generated some of our own examples to 
cover aspects of gender privilege that were not 
represented. We provided 20 group differences 
for women, and 21 group differences for men. 
Gender differences included the following 
categories:
• Gender roles (e.g. women are more likely than 
men to have people stop and offer assistance 
with car trouble/women are more likely than 
men to have to do housework).
• Treatment by authorities (e.g. women are more 
likely than men to pay less for auto insurance/
men are more likely than women to get fair 
estimates for auto repairs).
• Financial (women are less likely than men to 
pay for a date/men are more likely than women 
to be given fair career opportunities).
• Freedom (e.g. women are less likely than men 
to appear weak when they cry/men are less 
likely than women to be afraid of being sexu-
ally harassed or raped).
• Special social treatment (e.g. women are more 
likely than men to receive fl owers/men are 
more likely than women to receive special 
help from professors on diffi cult material).
• Help from others (e.g. women are less likely than 
men to be asked to lift heavy objects/men 
are less likely than women to be expected 
to take time off of work to care for others 
such as children or elderly members of one’s 
family).
Some examples of group differences for Whites 
(n = 19) were selected from McIntosh’s (1998) 
list of White privileges. Again, we generated add-
itional items to cover unrepresented areas. Racial 
differences included the following categories: 
• Financial (e.g. Whites are more likely than 
Blacks to have an economic ‘safety net’ to 
fall back on in times of fi nancial trouble).
• Historical distortion (Whites are more likely 
than Blacks to have historical struggles re-
presented in history books).
• Social treatment (Whites are more likely than 
Blacks to be able to be able to complain about 
colleague or coworker behaviors without it 
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being assumed that the matter is a racial 
issue). 
• Political (e.g. Blacks are more likely than 
Whites to have skin color taken into account 
when police decide whether to perform a 
routine traffi c stop).
After reading each group-specifi c example, par-
ticipants fi rst evaluated inequality by indicating 
how important the difference was (e.g. it is 
an important group difference within society, 
regardless of whether it favors men or women) 
and how advantageous the difference was for 
their group (e.g. it is actually an advantage that 
men have relative to women). Participants then 
evaluated how justifi able the difference was 
(i.e. it is justifi able or fair). Next, participants 
evaluated the extent to which their ingroup 
was responsible for creating (e.g. Whites are 
the source of the advantage) and maintaining 
(e.g. Whites maintain the advantage) the group 
difference. Finally each group-specifi c difference 
was evaluated for how the difference made them 
feel (e.g. guilty that men have this advantage 
relative to women). All responses were made on 
a 1 not at all to 4 very much scale. We standardized 
all variables before conducting the analyses 
reported below. 
Results
The data for the present research were nested 
within participants; therefore the ratings of each 
group difference were not independent. To 
account for the interdependence, we used 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling to conduct multi-
level modeling (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & 
Congdon, 2004) and test the extent to which 
our proposed antecedents predict group-based 
guilt. An additional advantage of multilevel 
modeling is that we can test for cross-level effects, 
or interactions, between groups and ratings 
of the group differences. In the present study, 
this means that we can test whether there are 
between-group differences in the extent to which 
the proposed antecedents predict group-based 
guilt. For instance, we can test whether the 
association between perceived responsibility 
and group-based guilt is equally strong for 
Whites, men and women. Additionally, cross-
level analyses control for main effects of group 
membership on the ratings. Because we stand-
ardized all items, the G coeffi cient in the analyses 
reported below can be interpreted similarly to a 
standardized beta weight in regression. 
Preliminary analyses 
Group differences in evaluations of the ante-
cedents and reports of guilt We fi rst constructed 
three dummy-coded contrasts to test whether 
evaluations of the antecedents and reports of 
guilt differed by group. One contrast compared 
Whites (2) versus men (–1) and women (–1). 
The second compared men (2) versus Whites 
(–1) and women (–1). The third compared 
women (2) versus Whites (–1) and men (–1). 
We then tested whether each contrast predicted 
each antecedent by entering the contrast as a 
level 2 predictor of each antecedent’s intercept. 
None of the contrasts signifi cantly predicted 
the intercept for inequality (G = –.002, SE = .02, 
p = ns, G = –.004, SE = .02, p = ns, G = –.001, 
SE = .02; Whites, men, women, respectively), 
responsibility (G = –.004, SE = .02, p = ns, G = –.007, 
SE = .03, p = ns, G = –.002, SE = .02, p = ns; Whites, 
men, women, respectively), or justifiability 
(G = –.001, SE = .02, p = ns, G = –.03, SE = .02, 
p = ns, G = .003, SE = .02, p = ns; Whites, men, 
women, respectively). Additionally, none of the 
contrasts signifi cantly predicted the intercept 
for guilt (G = –.009, SE = .03, p = ns, G = .02, 
SE = .03, p = ns, G = –.009, SE = .03, p = ns; 
Whites, men, women, respectively). Therefore, 
Whites, men and women all perceived inequality, 
responsibility and justifi ability, and reported 
group-based guilt, to the same extent.1 
Correlations between the antecedents We fi rst 
investigated the appropriateness of combining 
the advantageousness and importance items 
to create a measure of inequality. The two 
evaluations are correlated, yet distinct at G = .25, 
SE = .01, p < .001. When examined separately, we 
fi nd the same pattern of results reported below 
for advantageousness and importance as for the 
composite measure of inequality. 
63
Mallett & Swim antecedents of group-based guilt
We then investigated the appropriateness of 
combining the evaluations of accountability for 
creating and maintaining a group difference 
to create a measure of responsibility. The asso-
ciation between ratings of accountability for 
creating and maintaining group differences was 
strong (G = .73, SE = .01, p < .001), suggesting 
that the distinction was not meaningful in the 
present study. Therefore we averaged the two 
measures together. When examined separately, 
we fi nd the same pattern of results reported 
below for both types of responsibility as for the 
composite measure.
We next assessed the correlations between the 
antecedents by entering one antecedent as the 
dependent variable and a second antecedent pre-
dicting that variable at level 1. In order to control 
for group membership, in separate analyses, we 
also entered each contrast as a level 2 predictor 
of the dependent variable. We found that the 
associations were identical when controlling for 
each contrast. Perceived inequality was correlated 
with perceived responsibility (G = .24, SE = .01, 
p < .001) and perceived justifi ability (G = .25, 
SE = .01, p < .001). Perceived justifi ability was 
correlated with perceived responsibility (G = .06, 
SE = .01, p < .001). 
Main effects 
We expected that each antecedent would be 
uniquely associated with group-based guilt, 
but that the strength of the associations might 
differ by group. We tested these two questions 
by entering inequality, responsibility and justi-
fi ability as level 1 predictors of group-based 
guilt. In three separate analyses, we entered 
the contrasts from above as a level 2 predictor 
of group-based guilt and of the slope for each 
predictor. For instance, we included the contrast 
between Whites versus men and women as a 
predictor of group-based guilt and the same 
contrast as a predictor of the slope measuring 
the association between perceived inequality 
and group-based guilt. Consistent with the lack 
of group differences reported above for group-
based guilt, none of the contrasts predicted the 
intercept (G = –.008, SE = .02, p = ns, G = .02, 
SE = .02, p = ns, G = –.007, SE = .02, p = ns ; Whites, 
men, women, respectively). However we did fi nd 
that the strength of associations between guilt 
and both inequality and responsibility differed 
on one or more contrasts. Specifi cally, the asso-
ciation between inequality and guilt differed for 
the contrast comparing women to Whites and 
men. Therefore we analyzed the association 
between inequality and guilt separately for each 
group and found that inequality was signifi cantly 
related to reports of group-based guilt for all 
three groups, but the association between 
inequality and guilt was stronger for Whites 
(G = .18, SE = .02, p < .001) and men (G = .18, 
SE = .02, p < .001), compared to women (G = .06, 
SE = .02, p < .01). The association between 
responsibility and guilt differed for all three 
contrasts (G = .05, SE = .01, p < .001, G = .03, 
SE = .01, p < .001, G = –.08, SE = .01, p < .00, 
Whites, men, women respectively). When we 
analyzed the association between responsibility 
and guilt separately for each group we found 
that, as with perceived inequality, the associ-
ation between responsibility and guilt was 
signifi cant for all three groups, but the asso-
ciation was stronger for Whites (G = .33, 
SE = .02, p < .001) and men (G = .30, SE = .02, 
p < .001), compared to women (G = .09, SE = .02, 
p < .001). There were no cross level effects for 
the association between justifi ability and guilt, 
but justifiability was significantly associated 
with guilt and the association did not differ by 
contrast (G = –.12, SE = .01, p < .001). 
Interactions
Finally, we tested for two- and three-way inter-
actions between inequality, responsibility and 
justifi ability. At level 1, we entered inequality, 
responsibility and justifi ability, as well as the 
two-way interactions between inequality and 
responsibility, inequality and justifi ability, and 
responsibility and justifi ability, and the three-
way interaction. In three separate analyses we 
entered each contrast as a level 2 predictor of 
group-based guilt and of the slope for the main 
effects, two-way and three-way interactions. 
The contrasts did not predict the slope for 
the three-way interaction. An analysis without 
the contrast predicting the slope showed that 
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the three-way interaction was not signifi cant 
(G = .007, SE = .007, p = ns).
We then removed the three-way interaction 
from the equation and tested whether the con-
trasts predicted the two-way interactions. At 
level 1, we entered inequality, responsibility and 
justifi ability, the two-way interactions between 
inequality and responsibility, inequality and 
justifi ability, and responsibility and justifi abil-
ity. At level 2, in three separate analyses we 
entered each contrast as a predictor of group-
based guilt and of the slope for the main effects 
and the two-way interactions. None of the 
contrasts predicted the slopes of the two-way 
interactions between inequality and responsibility 
or between inequality and justifi ability. When 
the contrast was not included as a predictor 
of the interactions, the interactions remained 
nonsignifi cant, indicating that there was no 
two-way interaction for inequality, and this was 
true for all three groups. 
The interaction between justifi ability and 
responsibility was signifi cant. Further, the con-
trast predicting the slope of the interaction was 
signifi cant for Whites versus men and women 
(G = –.02, SE = .01, p = .004) and men versus 
Whites and women (G = .02, SE = .01, p = .002), 
but not for women versus Whites and men 
(G = –.005, SE = .006, p = ns). Because two of 
the three contrasts were signifi cant, we analyzed 
the interaction separately for each group by 
including justifi ability, responsibility and their 
interaction as level 1 predictors of group-based 
guilt. The interaction was signifi cant for Whites 
(G = –.08, SE = .01, p < .001)2 and women (G = 
–.05, SE = .02, p = .02), but not for men (G = .002, 
SE = .02, p = ns). 
We expected that responsibility would be a 
stronger predictor of guilt when justifi ability 
was low and when inequality was high. The 
three-way interaction did not support this effect; 
however by extension we would predict the 
same pattern for a two-way interaction between 
justifi ability and responsibility. Consistent with 
this prediction, an examination of the means 
indicates that the most guilt was experienced 
when responsibility was high and justifi ability 
was low. Figures 1a and 1b show the pattern of 
the interaction for Whites and women. We also 
examined the simple effects for responsibility 
predicting guilt at low, medium and high levels of 
justifi ability and for justifi ability predicting guilt 
at low, medium and high levels of responsibility. 
For Whites, responsibility predicted guilt at all 
levels of justifi ability, but was slightly stronger 
when justifiability was low (ω′  = .46 (.05), 
t = 20.42, p < .001) than when justifi ability was 
medium (ω′  = .38 (.02), t = 21.05, p < .001) or 
high (ω′  = .29 (.02), t = 13.66, p < .001). Further, 
justifi ability predicted group-based guilt when 
responsibility was medium (ω′  = .11 (.02), 
t = 7.52, p < .001) and high (ω′  = .19 (.02), 
Figure 1a. The two-way interaction between justifi ability and responsibility for reports of White guilt. 
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t = 10.31, p < .001), but not when responsibility 
was low (ω′  = .03 (.02), t = 1.43, p = ns). For 
women, responsibility predicted guilt when 
justifi ability was low (ω′  = .17 (.04), t = 4.46, 
p < .001) and medium (ω′  = .08 (.02), t = 4.19, 
p < .001), but not when justifi ability was high 
(ω′  = –.01 (.04), t = –.17, p = ns). Replicating 
the results for Whites, justifi ability predicted 
group-based guilt when responsibility was 
medium (ω′  = –.12 (.06), t = –2.04, p = .04) and 
high (ω′  = –.22 (.07), t = –3.12, p = .002), but 
not when responsibility was low (ω′  = –.04 (.07), 
t = –.53, p = ns). 
Discussion
The present research makes several important 
contributions to the literature on group-based 
guilt. First, we fi nd that Whites, men and women 
perceive the same extent of inequality, respon-
sibility, justifi ability and group-based guilt. This 
is interesting given the fact that women are a 
low status, disadvantaged group, and might be 
expected to view their privileges as compensation 
for their low social status, thereby attenuating 
the infl uence of the antecedents on group-based 
guilt or reporting less guilt. 
Second, we fi nd that inequality, responsibility 
and justifi ability are each unique and signifi cant 
predictors of group-based guilt for Whites, men 
and women. When considering differences that 
favor the ingroup, people need to go beyond 
merely recognizing that a difference exists; 
they need to acknowledge the added advantage 
and importance that the difference provides 
for the ingroup in order to feel group-based 
guilt. We also fi nd that for all three groups, per-
ceptions of ingroup responsibility were positively 
related to reports of group-based guilt and that 
the justifi cations for group differences were 
negatively related to reports of group-based guilt. 
This is the fi rst research to establish the unique 
predictive ability of justifi ability in the context of 
inequality and responsibility. Thus consistently 
across groups, we fi nd reliable additive effects 
of perceived inequality, responsibility and 
justifi ability of group differences for reports of 
group-based guilt. 
Third, we fi nd that although all three ante-
cedents were significantly associated with 
reports of group-based guilt, the strength of 
some associations differed by group. Perceived 
inequality was a stronger predictor of group-
based guilt for Whites and men than for women. 
Although possibly due to the types of privileges 
that participants considered, the strength of the 
association between inequality and guilt might 
have been weaker for women because women 
perceived their privileges within the context of 
larger social inequality. Perceptions of ingroup 
Figure 1b. The two-way interaction between justifi ability and responsibility for reports of women’s gender-
based guilt. 
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responsibility were also a stronger predictor of 
guilt for Whites than for men and women. The 
association between responsibility and gender-
based guilt, compared to race-based guilt, might 
have been weakened if gender differences were 
attributed to biology and complementarity more 
so than racial differences. 
Fourth, we fi nd an interaction between justi-
fiability and responsibility for women and 
Whites but not for men, indicating that for men, 
responsibility and justifi ability independently 
predict gender-based guilt. But when Whites 
considered race-based guilt and when women 
considered gender-based guilt, responsibility 
played a greater role when group differences 
were not very justifi able. Because the infl uence of 
responsibility on group-based guilt was tempered 
by justifi cations for ingroup privilege, a lack 
of justifi cations for privilege is also necessary 
for feelings of group-based guilt in Whites 
and women. Interestingly, the effect of perceived 
inequality was not moderated by perceived in-
group responsibility or justifi cations for ingroup 
privilege. Therefore, for at least some people, 
feelings of group-based guilt do not require 
perceived ingroup responsibility or a lack of 
justifi cations for ingroup privilege. This fi nding is 
in line with Hoffman’s (1994) work on feelings of 
guilt at the individual level—especially situations 
where people are innocent bystanders or a virtual 
transgressor. In both cases, the individual is not 
necessarily responsible for a transgression but 
feels guilt anyway. 
It is diffi cult to know precisely why the inter-
action between justifi ability and responsibility 
only occurred for Whites and women. Perhaps 
men occupy a unique position as members of 
an advantaged gender group. Future research 
should sample a wider variety of groups to deter-
mine exactly when the antecedents are additive 
versus interactive as different types of advantaged 
groups, including heterosexuals or able-bodied 
individuals, may also differ in the experience of 
guilt. We anticipate that perceived inequality, 
responsibility and justifi ability will still predict 
group-based guilt, but that evaluations of the 
antecedents might vary. Finally, future research 
could continue to test our model by examining 
how other disadvantaged groups, including 
Blacks, non-heterosexuals and the disabled, 
assess their privileges. Other disadvantaged 
groups’ privileges may be qualitatively different 
from those experienced by women, given that 
women’s privileges are largely based upon 
gender role norms. 
It would also be interesting to consider add-
itional antecedents of guilt that operate at 
the interpersonal level. We chose to examine 
antecedents of guilt that operate regardless 
of the relationship between social groups, but 
Baumeister and colleagues (1994) describe 
antecedents of guilt that appear in close, com-
munal relationships where two individuals are 
concerned about each other’s welfare. It would 
be interesting to assess the degree of connection 
that an advantaged group feels to a disadvantaged 
group because greater feelings of connection 
with the outgroup might be associated with 
greater reports of group-based guilt. In the case 
of communal interpersonal relationships, the 
fear of rejection because of an interpersonal 
transgression leads to guilt. Therefore if an 
advantaged group feels connected to a disadvan-
taged group, then assessments of the anxiety or 
fear associated with rejection might also predict 
feelings of group-based guilt. 
The present research represents an important 
advance in our understanding of the antecedents 
of group-based guilt. We chose to use specifi c 
examples of group differences that uniquely 
applied to each group so that we could test the 
effects of evaluations of our antecedents within 
individuals, using multilevel modeling. By using 
a variety of differences, we took advantage of 
naturalistic, existing group differences rather 
than holding group differences constant or ex-
perimentally manipulating the extent to which 
group differences were brought to mind. We 
covered a wide variety of categories including 
group differences that occur in fi nancial, historical, 
social and political realms, as well as in gender 
roles, treatment by authorities, freedom and 
help from others.3 Yet despite the diversity of 
specifi c group differences that we addressed, 
we cannot know whether the groups would dif-
ferentially perceive the antecedents or whether 
the antecedents would have different associations 
with guilt if they were described more generally 
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(e.g. Whites have many privileges that Blacks do 
not) or if participants were allowed to generate 
their own list of group differences. Future re-
search could examine this possibility, and also 
build from our existing work by manipulating 
levels of inequality, responsibility and justifi abil-
ity that appear in overall group differences to be 
either high or low. Doing so would further clarify 
whether there are mainly additive effects or 
whether being presented with high or low levels 
of the antecedents produces interactions.
In conclusion, feelings of group-based guilt 
can motivate prosocial behavior in many forms. 
As a result of feeling group-based guilt, Whites 
support affi rmative action for Blacks (Swim & 
Miller, 1999), and both Whites and heterosexuals 
take collective action on behalf of Blacks and 
non-heterosexuals (Mallett, et al., 2006). Yet 
feelings of group-based guilt are relatively 
rare compared to other group-based emotions 
(Branscombe et al., 2004). Given the benefi cial 
consequences of group-based guilt for intergroup 
relations, it is important to understand what 
factors lead to feelings of group-based guilt. 
Our research reveals that perceived inequality, 
responsibility and justifi ability consistently pre-
dict feelings of group-based guilt for Whites, men 
and women. Understanding the antecedents 
of group-based guilt across a variety of social 
groups brings us one step closer to improving 
intergroup relations.
Notes
1. In addition to testing the three contrasts, we 
also tested whether each group differed from 
the other. That is, we compared Whites to men, 
Whites to women and men to women. Again, 
none of the contrasts signifi cantly predicted the 
intercept of any antecedent or of group-based 
guilt. 
2. To test whether gender signifi cantly affected 
the interaction in the White data set, we added 
gender of participant as a level 2 predictor. It 
was not signifi cant (G = .03, SE = .11, p = ns). 
3. To test whether our results varied by the type 
of group difference, we conducted separate 
analyses on each subgroup of differences. For 
example, for Whites, we compared fi nancial 
differences to historical, social and political 
differences. Our results replicated across all 
subgroups for Whites and women, and across 
three of the fi ve subgroups for men. This 
suggests that although we did not present 
Whites, women and men with identical group 
differences, the pattern of results that we 
present replicates across the same categories of 
group differences for many social groups.
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